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Abstract
We generalize the classic problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods to the
problem of fair public decision making, in which a decision must be made on
several social issues simultaneously, and, unlike the classic setting, a decision can
provide positive utility to multiple players. We extend the popular fairness no-
tion of proportionality (which is not guaranteeable) to our more general setting,
and introduce three novel relaxations — proportionality up to one issue, round
robin share, and pessimistic proportional share — that are also interesting in
the classic goods allocation setting. We show that the Maximum Nash Welfare
solution, which is known to satisfy appealing fairness properties in the classic
setting, satisfies or approximates all three relaxations in our framework. We also
provide polynomial time algorithms and hardness results for finding allocations
satisfying these axioms, with or without insisting on Pareto optimality.
1 Introduction
The literature on mathematically rigorous fair division dates back to the work of
Steinhaus [33]. In the field’s long history, most work focuses on the fair division of
private goods, in which a set of m items must be divided among a set of n players.
Agents express their preferences by specifying their value for each good, and our goal
is to find a division of the goods that is fair to all players.
One particularly appealing notion of fairness is envy-freeness [18], which says that
no player should want to switch her set of items with that of another player. This is
a natural and strong notion of fairness that has long been the subject of fair division
research [34, 32, 22, 21, 8, 9, 13]. It actually implies many other fairness notions such
as proportionality [33] — each player should get at least a 1/n fraction of her value
for the entire set of goods — and envy-freeness up to one good (EF1) [26] — no player
should envy another player after removing at most one good from the latter player’s
bundle. Unfortunately, envy-freeness cannot always be guaranteed, and therefore its
relaxations have been focused on [26, 11, 30, 14].
Division of private goods, however, is not the only application in which we may
desire a fair outcome. Often, we may need to make decisions where every alternative
∗A preliminary version of this paper appears in EC’17.
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gives positive utility to many players, rather than to just one player as in the case of
private goods. For instance, consider a couple, Alice and Bob, deciding where to go
to dinner. Alice likes Italian food the most, but does not like Indian, whereas Bob
prefers Indian food but does not like Italian. When there is only a single decision
to make, we are simply in a classic bargaining game where players must attempt to
arrive at a mutually agreeable solution. Nash [28] proposed maximizing the product
of players’ utilities (the Nash welfare) as an elegant solution that uniquely satisfies
several appealing properties. But no matter how we arrive at a decision – and there is
a myriad of work in computational social choice [10] discussing how exactly we should
do so – some tradeoff must necessarily be made, and we may not be able to make
everyone happy.
However, if we have several public decisions to make, maybe we can reach a com-
promise by making sure that all players are happy with at least some of the decisions.
For example, if Alice and Bob are to follow their dinner with a movie, then maybe
Bob will be willing to eat Italian food for dinner if he gets to pick his favorite movie,
and maybe Alice will agree to this compromise.
Note that this setting generalizes the classic private goods setting, because in this
special case we can view each public decision as the allocation of a single good. While
envy is a compelling notion in the private goods setting, it makes less sense for public
decisions. In our example, irrespective of where Alice and Bob go for dinner, because
they are eating the same food, it is not clear what it would mean for Alice to envy Bob.
If she could somehow trade places with Bob, she would still be sitting at the other
end of the dinner table, eating the same food, and not be any better off. Thankfully,
proportionality still has a sensible interpretation: Each player should get at least a
1/n fraction of the utility she would get if her most desired alternative was chosen for
each decision. Unfortunately, as with envy-freeness, proportionality cannot always
be guaranteed. Therefore in this work we consider relaxations of proportionality in
order to arrive at fairness notions that can be guaranteed.
1.1 Our Results
Formally, a public decision making problem consists of m issues, where each issue has
several associated alternatives. Each of n players has a utility for each alternative of
each issue. Making a decision on an issue amounts to choosing one of the alternatives
associated with the issue, and choosing an overall outcome requires making a decision
on each issue simultaneously. The utility to a player for an outcome is the sum of her
utilities for the alternatives chosen for different issues. This is a very simple setting,
but one in which the problem of fairness is already non-trivial.
We propose relaxations of proportionality in two directions. The first, proportion-
ality up to one issue (Prop1), is similar in spirit to EF1, stating that a player should
be able to get her proportional share if she gets to change the outcome of a single issue
in her favor. The second direction is based on the guarantees provided by the round
robin mechanism. This mechanism first orders the set of players, and then repeatedly
goes through the ordering, allowing each player to make her favorite decision on any
single issue, until decisions are made on all the issues. Our first relaxation in this
direction, the round robin share (RRS), guarantees each player the utility that she
would have received under the round robin mechanism if she were the last player in
the ordering. Note that the round robin mechanism lets each player make decisions
on roughly the same number of issues. A further relaxation in this direction, the pes-
simistic proportional share (PPS), guarantees each player the utility that she would
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get if her favorite alternatives were chosen for (approximately) a 1/n fraction of the
issues, where these issues are chosen adversarially.
We examine the possibility and computational complexity of satisfying combina-
tions of these fairness desiderata. We first observe that the round robin mechanism
satisfies both Prop1 and RRS (and thus PPS). However, it fails to satisfy even the
most basic efficiency property, Pareto optimality (PO), which requires that no other
outcome should be able to make a player strictly better off without making at least
one player strictly worse off.
PO PPS RRS Prop1
MNW, Private goods X X (Th. 10) 12 (Th. 10) X (Th. 4)
MNW, Public decisions X (Th. 4) 1
n
(Th. 8) 1
n
(Th. 8) X (Th. 4)
Leximin Mechanism X X (Th. 2) X (Th. 2) 12 (Th. 2)
Round Robin Method × X (Th. 1) X (Th. 1) X (Th. 1)
Table 1: Axioms satisfied or approximated by the mechanisms we consider. The MNW
solution is split into private goods and general decisions because we obtain significantly
stronger results for private goods. Results for the leximin mechanism and the round robin
method apply equally to private goods and public decisions. The approximation results are
lower bounds; we omit the upper bounds from the table for simplicity.
When insisting on Pareto optimality, we observe that the leximin mechanism —
informally, it chooses the outcome that maximizes the minimum utility to any player
— satisfies RRS (therefore PPS) and PO via a simple argument. However, this ar-
gument does not extend to establishing Prop1, although we show that RRS implies a
1/2 approximation to Prop1. To that end, we prove that the maximum Nash welfare
(MNW) solution — informally, it chooses the outcome that maximizes the product
of utilities to players — that is known for its many desirable fairness properties in
dividing private goods [14] satisfies Prop1 and PO in our public decision making
framework, and simultaneously provides a 1/n approximation to both RRS and PPS.
We also show that this approximation is tight up to a factor of O(log n). For division
of private goods, these approximations improve significantly: the MNW solution com-
pletely satisfies PPS, and provides an n/(2n−1) > 1/2 approximation (but not better
than 2/3 approximation in the worst case) to RRS. Table 1 provides a summary of
these results.
However, both the MNW outcome and the leximin outcome are NP-hard to
compute. It is therefore natural to consider whether our fairness properties can be
achieved in conjunction with PO in polynomial time. For public decision making, the
answer turns out to be negative for PPS and RRS, assuming P 6= NP . For division of
private goods, however, we show that there exists a polynomial time algorithm that
satisfies PPS and PO.
1.2 Related Work
Two classic fair division mechanisms — the leximin mechanism and the maximum
Nash welfare (MNW) solution — play an important role in this paper. Both mech-
anisms have been extensively studied in the literature on private goods division. In
particular, Kurokawa et al. [23] (Section 3.2) show that the leximin mechanism sat-
isfies envy-freeness, proportionality, Pareto optimality, and a strong game-theoretic
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notion called group strategyproofness, which prevents even groups of players from
manipulating the outcome to their benefit by misrepresenting their preferences, in
a broad fair division domain with private goods and a specific form of non-additive
utilities. On the other hand, the MNW solution has been well studied in the realm of
additive utilities [31, 14]. For divisible goods, the MNW solution coincides with an-
other well-known solution concept called competitive equilibrium from equal incomes
(CEEI) [34], which also admits an approximate version for indivisible goods [11]. For
indivisible goods, the MNW solution satisfies envy-freeness up to one good, Pareto
optimality, and approximations to other fairness guarantees. One line of research
aims to approximate the optimum Nash welfare [16, 25], although it is unclear if this
achieves any of the appealing fairness guarantees of the MNW solution.
Our model is closely related to that of voting in combinatorial domains (see [24] for
an overview). However, this literature focuses on the case where there is dependency
between decisions on different issues. In contrast, our model remains interesting even
though the issues are independent, and incorporating dependency is an interesting
future direction. Although there is a range of work in the voting literature that
focuses on fairness [15, 27, 6, 3], especially in the context of representation in multi-
winner elections, it focuses on ordinal, rather than cardinal, preferences.1 Another
difference is that fairness concepts in voting apply most naturally when n >> m,
whereas our notions of fairness are most interesting when m > n.
Our work is also reminiscent of the participatory budgeting problem [12], in which
there are multiple public projects with different costs, and a set of projects need to be
chosen based on preferences of the participants over the projects, subject to a budget
constraint. Recently, researchers in computational social choice have addressed this
problem from an axiomatic viewpoint [20], including fairness considerations [17], and
from the viewpoint of implicit utilitarian voting [5]. However, they assume access
only to ordinal preferences (that may stem from underlying cardinal utilities), while
we assume a direct access to cardinal utilities, as is common in the fair division
literature. Also, we do not have a budget constraint that binds the outcomes on
different issues.
2 Model
For k ∈ N, define [k] , {1, . . . , k}. Before we introduce the problem we study in this
paper, let us review the standard fair division setting with private goods.
Private goods division. A private goods division problem consists of a set of
players N = [n] and a set of m goods M . Each player i ∈ N is endowed with a utility
function ui : M → R+ such that ui(g) denotes the value player i derives from good
g ∈ M . A standard assumption in the literature is that of additive valuations, i.e.,
(slightly abusing the notation) ui(S) =
∑
g∈S ui(g) for S ⊆M . An allocation A is a
partition of the set of goods among the set of players, where Ai denotes the bundle
of goods received by player i. Importantly, players only derive utility from the goods
they receive, i.e., the goods private to them. The utility of player i under allocation
A is ui(A) = ui(Ai).
Public decision making. A public decision making problem also has a set of players
N = [n], but instead of private goods, it has a set of issues T = [m]. Each issue t ∈ T
1That said, there is a recent line of work on implicit utilitarian voting that attempts to maximize
an objective with respect to the cardinal utilities underlying the ordinal preferences [29, 7], and is
therefore closer to our work.
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has an associated set of alternatives At = {at1, . . . , a
t
kt
}, exactly one of which must
be chosen. Each player i is endowed with a utility function uti : A
t → R+ for each
issue t, and derives utility uti(a
t
j) if alternative a
t
j is chosen for issue t. In contrast
to private goods division, a single alternative can provide positive utility to multiple
players.
An outcome c = (c1, . . . , cm) of a public decision making problem is a choice of
an alternative for every issue, i.e., it consists of an outcome ct ∈ At for each issue
t ∈ T . Let C denote the space of possible outcomes. Slightly abusing the notation,
let uti(c) = u
t
i(ct) be the utility player i derives from the outcome of issue t. We
also assume additive valuations: let ui(c) =
∑
t∈T u
t
i(c) be the utility player i derives
from outcome c.
In this work, we study deterministic outcomes, and in Section 5, discuss the impli-
cations when randomized outcomes are allowed. Further, we study the offline problem
in which we are presented with the entire problem up front, and need to choose the
outcomes on all issues simultaneously. One can also define an online version of the
problem [19], in which we must commit to the outcome of issue t before observing
issues t′ with t′ > t for all t, but we do not consider that version here.
Private goods versus public decisions. To see why public decision making gener-
alizes private goods division, take an instance of private goods division, and create an
instance of public decision making as follows. Create an issue tg for each good g. Let
there be n alternatives in Atg , where alternative a
tg
i gives player i utility ui(g) while
giving zero utility to all other players. It is easy to see that choosing alternative a
tg
i
is equivalent to allocating good g to player i. Hence, the constructed public decision
making problem effectively mimics the underlying private goods division problem.
2.1 Efficiency and Fairness
In this paper, we not only adapt classical notions of efficiency and fairness defined
for private goods division to our public decision making problem, but also introduce
three fairness axioms that are novel for both public decision making and private goods
division. First, we need additional notation that we will use throughout the paper.
Let p , ⌊m/n⌋. For issue t ∈ T and player i ∈ N , let atmax(i) ∈ argmaxa∈At{u
t
i(a)}
and utmax(i) = u
t
i(a
t
max(i)). That is, a
t
max(i) is an alternative that gives player i the
most utility for issue t, and utmax(i) is the utility player i derives from a
t
max(i). Let
the sequence 〈u
(1)
max(i), . . . , u
(m)
max(i)〉 represent the maximum utilities player i can de-
rive from different issues, sorted in a non-ascending order. Hence, {u
(k)
max(i)}k∈[m] =
{utmax(i)}t∈T and u
(k)
max(i) > u
(k+1)
max (i) for k ∈ [m− 1].
Efficiency. In this paper, we focus on a popular notion of economic efficiency. We
say that an outcome c is Pareto optimal (PO) if there does not exist another outcome
c′ that can provide at least as much utility as c to every player, i.e., ui(c
′) > ui(c)
for all i ∈ N , and strictly more utility than c to some player, i.e., ui∗(c′) > ui∗(c) for
some i∗ ∈ N .
Fairness. For private goods division, perhaps the most prominent notion of fairness
is envy-freeness [18]. An allocationA is called envy-free (EF) if every player values her
bundle at least as much as she values any other player’s bundle, i.e., ui(Ai) > ui(Aj)
for all i, j ∈ N . Because envy-freeness cannot in general be guaranteed, prior work
also focuses on its relaxations. For instance, an allocation A is called envy-free up to
one good (EF1) if no player envies another player after removing at most one good
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from the latter player’s bundle, i.e., for all i, j ∈ N , either ui(Ai) > ui(Aj) or ∃gj ∈ Aj
such that ui(Ai) > ui(Aj \ {gj}).
Unfortunately, as argued in Section 1, the notion of envy is not well defined for
public decisions. Hence, for public decision making, we focus on another fairness ax-
iom, Proportionality, and its relaxations. For private goods division, proportionality
is implied by envy-freeness.2
Proportionality (Prop). At a high level, proportionality requires that each player
must receive at least her “proportional share”, which is a 1/n fraction of the utility she
would derive if she could act as the dictator. For a public decision making problem,
the proportional share of player i (Propi) is 1/n times the sum of the maximum
utilities the player can derive across all issues, i.e.,
Propi =
1
n
∑
t∈T
utmax(i).
For α ∈ (0, 1], we say that an outcome c satisfies α-proportionality (α-Prop) if ui(c) >
α · Propi for all players i ∈ N . We refer to 1-Prop simply as Prop.
Proportionality up to one issue (Prop1). We introduce a novel relaxation of
proportionality (more generally, of α-proportionality) in the same spirit as envy-
freeness up to one good, which is a relaxation of envy-freeness. For α ∈ (0, 1], we say
that an outcome c satisfies α-proportionality up to one issue (α-Prop1) if for every
player i ∈ N , there exists an issue t ∈ T such that, ceteris paribus, changing the
outcome of t from ct to a
t
max(i) ensures that player i achieves an α fraction of her
proportional share, i.e., if
∀i ∈ N ∃t ∈ T s.t. ui(c)− u
t
i(c) + u
t
max(i) > α · Propi.
We refer to 1-Prop1 simply as Prop1.
Round robin share (RRS). Next, we introduce another novel fairness axiom that
is motivated from the classic round robin method that, for private goods, lets players
take turns and in each turn, pick a single most favorite item left unclaimed. For public
decision making, we instead let players make a decision on a single issue in each turn.
The utility guaranteed to the players by this approach is captured by the following
fairness axiom.
Recall that the sequence 〈u
(1)
max(i), . . . , u
(m)
max(i)〉 represents the maximum utility
player i can derive from different issues, sorted in a non-ascending order. Then, we
define the round robin share of player i (RRSi) as
RRSi =
p∑
k=1
u(k·n)max (i).
This is player i’s utility from the round robin method, if she is last in the ordering
and all issues she does not control give her utility 0. For α ∈ (0, 1], we say that an
outcome c satisfies α-round robin share (α-RRS) if ui(c) > α · RRSi for all players
i ∈ N . Again, we refer to 1-RRS simply as RRS.
Pessimistic proportional share (PPS). We introduce another novel fairness ax-
iom that is a further relaxation of round robin share. Note that the round robin
2This assumes non-wastefulness, i.e., that all goods are allocated. We make this assumption
throughout the paper.
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method, by letting players make a decision on a single issue per turn, allows each
player to make decisions on at least p = ⌊m/n⌋ issues. The following axiom cap-
tures the utility players would be guaranteed if each player still made decisions on a
“proportional share” of p issues, but if these issues were chosen pessimistically.
We define the pessimistic proportional share of player i (PPSi) to be the sum of
the maximum utilities the player can derive from a set of p issues, chosen adversarially
to minimize this sum:
PPSi =
m∑
k=m−p+1
u(k)max(i).
For α ∈ (0, 1], we say that an outcome c satisfies α-pessimistic proportional share
(α-PPS) if ui(c) > α ·PPSi for all players i ∈ N . Again, we refer to 1-PPS simply as
PPS.
Connections among fairness properties. Trivially, proportionality (Prop) implies
proportionality up to one issue (Prop1). In addition, it can also be checked that the
following sequence of logical implications holds: Prop =⇒ MMS =⇒ RRS =⇒
PPS.
Here, MMS is the maximin share guarantee [11, 30]. Adapting the definition
naturally from private goods division to public decision making, the maximin share
of a player is the utility the player can guarantee herself by dividing the set of issues
into n bundles, if she gets to make the decisions best for her on the issues in an
adversarially chosen bundle. The maximin share (MMS) guarantee requires that each
player must receive utility that is at least her maximin share. We do not focus on the
maximin share guarantee in this paper.
2.2 Mechanisms
A mechanism for a public decision making problem (resp. a private goods division
problem) maps each input instance of the problem to an outcome (resp. an allocation).
We say that a mechanism satisfies a fairness or efficiency property if it always returns
an outcome satisfying the property. There are three prominent mechanisms that play
a key role in this paper.
Round robin method. As mentioned earlier, the round robin method first fixes
an ordering of the players. Then the players take turns choosing their most pre-
ferred alternative on a single issue of their choice whose outcome has not yet been
determined.
The leximin mechanism. The leximin mechanism chooses an outcome which max-
imizes the utility of the worst off player, i.e., mini∈N ui(c). Subject to this constraint,
it maximizes the utility of the second least well off player, and so on. Note that
the leximin mechanism is trivially Pareto optimal because if it were possible to im-
prove some player’s utility without reducing that of any other, it would improve the
objective that the leximin mechanism optimizes.
Maximum Nash welfare (MNW). The Nash welfare of an outcome c is the prod-
uct of utilities to all players under c: NW (c) =
∏
i∈N ui(c). When there exists an
outcome c with NW (c) > 0, then the MNW solution chooses an arbitrary outcome c
that maximizes the Nash welfare. When all outcomes have zero Nash welfare, it finds
a largest cardinality set S of players that can be given non-zero utility, and selects an
outcome maximizing the product of their utilities, i.e.,
∏
i∈S ui(c).
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2.3 Examples
We illustrate the fairness properties through two examples.
Example 1. Consider a public decision making problem with two players (N = [2])
and two issues (T = [2]). Each issue has two alternatives (|A1| = |A2| = 2). The
utilities of the two players for the two alternatives in both issues are as follows.
at1 a
t
2
ut1 1 0
ut2 0 1
for t ∈ [2].
The various fair shares of the two players are Prop1 = RRS1 = PPS1 = Prop2 =
RRS2 = PPS2 = 1. Now, outcome c = (a
1
1, a
2
1) gives utilities u1(c) = 2 and u2(c) = 0,
and therefore violates Prop, RRS, and PPS. It satisfies Prop1 because switching the
decision on either issue in favor of player 2 makes her achieve her proportional share.
On the other hand, outcome c = (a11, a
2
2) gives utility 1 to both players, and thus
satisfies Prop (as well as Prop1, RRS, and PPS, which are relaxations of Prop).
Example 2. Consider a public decision making problem with two players (N = [2])
and eight issues (T = [8]). Once again, each issue has two alternatives, for which the
utilities of the two players are as follows.
at1 a
t
2
ut1 1 0
ut2 0 1
for t ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}, and
at1 a
t
2
ut1 1 0
ut2 0 0
for t ∈ {5, 6, 7, 8}.
In this case, we have Prop1 = RRS1 = PPS1 = 4, whereas Prop2 = RRS2 = 2
and PPS2 = 0. Consider outcome c = (a
1
1, a
2
1, a
3
1, a
4
1, a
5
1, a
6
1, a
7
1, a
8
1). Then, we have
u1(c) = 8 while u2(c) = 0, which satisfies PPS but violates RRS. Further, c also
violates Prop1 because switching the outcome of any single issue can only give player
2 utility at most 1, which is less than Prop2 = 2. On the other hand, outcome
c = (a12, a
2
2, a
3
2, a
4
2, a
5
1, a
6
1, a
7
1, a
8
1) achieves u1(c) = u2(c) = 4, and satisfies Prop (and
thus its relaxations Prop1, RRS, and PPS).
3 (Approximate) Satisfiability of Axioms
If we are willing to sacrifice Pareto optimality, then we can easily achieve both RRS
(and therefore PPS) and Prop1 simultaneously with the round robin mechanism. This
is not a surprising result. RRS is defined based on the guarantee provided by the round
robin mechanism, and PPS is a relaxation of RRS. The round robin mechanism is also
known to satisfy EF1 for private goods division, which is similar in spirit to Prop1.
Theorem 1. The round robin mechanism satisfies RRS (and therefore PPS) and
Prop1, and runs in polynomial time.
Proof. The round robin mechanism clearly runs in polynomial time (note that it is
easy for a player to choose the next issue on which to determine the outcome). To
see why it satisfies RRS, note that the mechanism allows every player to make a
decision on one issue once every n turns. Thus, for each k ∈ [p], every player gets to
make decisions on at least k of her “top” k · n issues, when issues are sorted in the
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descending order of the utility her favorite alternative in the issue gives her. It is easy
to see that this implies every player i gets utility at least RRSi. Because RRS implies
PPS, the mechanism also satisfies PPS. It remains to show that it satisfies Prop1 as
well.
Fix a player i and let c be the outcome produced by the round robin mechanism
for some choosing order of the players. Because the round robin mechanism satisfies
RRS, player i gets utility at least
ui(c) >
p∑
k=1
u(k·n)max (i).
For k ∈ [m], let the kth favorite issue of player i be the issue t for which utmax(i)
is the kth highest. Let ℓ ∈ N ∪ {0} be the largest index such that for every k ∈ [ℓ],
outcome c chooses player i’s most preferred alternative on her kth favorite issue.
Let t∗ be her (ℓ + 1)th favorite issue. To show that c satisfies Prop1, we construct
outcome c′ from c by only changing the outcome of issue t∗ to at
∗
max(i), and show
that ui(c
′) > Propi. Note that if ℓ > p, then
ui(c
′) >
ℓ+1∑
k=1
u(k)max(i) >
p+1∑
k=1
u(k)max(i) >
1
n
m∑
k=1
u(k)max(i) = Propi.
Let ℓ < p. Then, using the fact that the round robin mechanism lets player i choose
her most preferred alternative for at least k of her favorite k · n issues for every k 6 p
(and her (ℓ+ 1)th favorite issue was not one of these), we have
ui(c
′) >
ℓ+1∑
k=1
u(k)max(i) +
p∑
k=ℓ+1
u(k·n)max (i)
>
1
n
(ℓ+1)·n∑
k=1
u(k)max(i) +
1
n
m∑
k=(ℓ+1)n+1
u(k)max(i) = Propi.
Therefore, the round robin mechanism satisfies Prop1. 
While this result seems to reflect favorably upon the round robin mechanism, re-
call that it violates Pareto optimality even for private goods division. For public
decision making, a simple reason for this is that the round robin mechanism, for
each issue, chooses an alternative that is some player’s favorite, while it could be
unanimously better to choose compromise solutions that make many players happy.
Imagine there are two players and two issues, each with two alternatives. The “ex-
treme” alternative in each issue i ∈ {1, 2} gives utility 1 to player i but 0 to the other,
while the “compromise” alternative in each issue i ∈ {1, 2} gives utility 2/3 to both
players. It is clear that both players prefer choosing the compromise alternative in
both issues to choosing the extreme alternative in both issues. Because such “Pareto
improvements” which make some players happier without making any player worse off
are unanimously preferred by the players, the round robin outcome becomes highly
undesirable. We therefore seek mechanisms that provide fairness guarantees while
satisfying Pareto optimality.
A natural question is whether there exists a mechanism that satisfies RRS, Prop1,
and PO. An obvious approach is to start from an outcome that already satisfies RRS
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and Prop1 (e.g., the round robin outcome), and make Pareto improvements until
no such improvements are possible. While Pareto improvements preserve RRS as
the utilities to the players do not decrease, Prop1 can be lost as it depends on the
exact alternatives chosen and not only on the utilities to the players. We leave it
as an important open question to determine if RRS, Prop1, and PO can be satisfied
simultaneously.
We therefore consider satisfying each fairness guarantee individually with PO. One
can easily find an outcome satisfying RRS and PO by following the aforementioned
approach of starting with an outcome satisfying RRS, and making Pareto improve-
ments while possible. There is also a more direct approach to satisfying RRS and PO.
Recall that the leximin mechanism chooses the outcome which maximizes the min-
imum utility to any player, subject to that maximizes the second minimum utility,
and so on. It is easy to see that this mechanism is always Pareto optimal. Now, let
us normalize the utilities of all players such that RRSi = 1 for every player i ∈ N .3
Because the round robin mechanism gives every player i utility at least RRSi = 1, it
must be the case that the leximin mechanism operating on these normalized utilities
must also give every player utility at least 1, and thus produce an outcome that is
both RRS and PO.
Theorem 2. The leximin mechanism satisfies RRS, PO, and (1/2)-Prop1.
That leximin satisfies (1/2)-Prop1 follows directly from the following lemma, and
noting that leximin satisfies RRS.
Lemma 3. RRS implies (1/2)-Prop1.
Proof. Note that
RRSi =
p∑
k=1
u(k·n)max (i) >
1
n
m∑
t=n+1
u(t)max(i)
and
u(1)max(i) >
1
n
n∑
t=1
u(t)max(i).
Summing the two equations, we get
RRSi + u
(1)
max(i) >
1
n
m∑
t=1
u(t)max(i) = Propi.
Therefore, max{RRSi, u
(1)
max(i)} > 12Propi.
Suppose that ui(c) > RRSi for some outcome c. Then either i already receives her
most valued item, in which case she receives utility at least max{RRSi, u
(1)
max(i)} >
1
2Propi, or she does not receive her most valued item. If she does not, then after giving
it to her, she receives utility at least 12Propi. Therefore, c satisfies (1/2)-Prop1. 
Next, we study whether we can achieve Prop1 and PO simultaneously. Neither of
the previous approaches seems to work: we already argued that following Pareto im-
provements could lose Prop1, and the normalization trick is difficult to apply because
Prop1 is not defined in terms of any fixed share of utility.
3Players with zero round robin share can be incorporated via a simple extension to the argument.
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One starting point to achieving Prop1 and PO is the maximum Nash welfare
(MNW) solution, which, for private goods division, is known to satisfy the similar
guarantee of EF1 and PO [14]. It turns out that the MNW solution is precisely what
we need.
Theorem 4. The MNW solution satisfies proportionality up to one issue (Prop1)
and Pareto optimality (PO).
Before we prove this, we need a folklore result, which essentially states that if the
sum of n terms is to be reduced by a fixed quantity δ that is less than each term,
then their product reduces the most when δ is taken out of the lowest term. The
following lemma proves this result when all initial terms are 1, which is sufficient for
our purpose. The proof of the lemma appears in the appendix.
Lemma 5. Let {x1, . . . , xn} be a set of n non-negative real numbers such that∑n
i=1max{0, 1− xi} 6 δ, where 0 < δ < 1. Then,
∏n
i=1 xi > 1− δ.
Proof of Theorem 4. Fix an instance of the public decision making problem. Let
S ⊆ N be the set of players that the MNW outcome c gives positive utility to. Then,
by the definition of the MNW outcome, S must be a largest set of players that can
simultaneously be given positive utility, and c must maximize the product of utilities
of players in S.
First, we show that c is PO. Note that a Pareto improvement over c must either
give a positive utility to a player in N \ S or give more utility to a player in S,
without reducing the utility to any player in S. This is a contradiction because it
violates either optimality of the size of S or optimality of the product of utilities of
players in S. Hence, MNW satisfies PO.
We now show that MNW also satisfies Prop1. Suppose for contradiction that
Prop1 is violated for player i under c. First, note that we must have Propi > 0.
Further, it must be the case that utmax(i) > 0 for at least n+ 1 issues. Were this not
the case, Prop1 would be trivially satisfied for player i since we can give her utility
u(1)max(i) >
1
n
n∑
t=1
u(t)max(i) =
1
n
m∑
t=1
u(t)max(i) = Propi
by changing the outcome on a single issue.
We now show that ui(c) > 0 (i.e., i ∈ S). For contradiction, suppose otherwise.
For each of the (at least) n + 1 issues with utmax(i) > 0, there must exist another
player j 6= i that gets positive utility only from that issue under c (otherwise we could
use that issue to give positive utility to i while not reducing any other agents’ utility
to zero, contradicting the maximality of S). But this is impossible, since there are at
least n+ 1 issues and only n− 1 agents (other than i).
Because MNW outcomes and the Prop1 property are invariant to individual scaling
of utilities, let us scale the utilities such that Propi = 1 and uj(c) = 1 for all j ∈ S\{i}.
Select issue t∗ ∈ T as
t∗ ∈ argmin
t∈T
∑
j∈N\{i} u
t
j(c)
utmax(i)− u
t
i(c)
.
Note that t∗ is well defined because utmax(i) > u
t
i(c) for at least one t ∈ T , otherwise
Prop1 would not be violated for player i.
We now show that outcome c′ such that c′t∗ = a
t∗
max(i) and c
′
t = ct for all t ∈ T \{t
∗}
achieves strictly greater product of utilities of players in S than outcome c does, which
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is a contradiction as c is an MNW outcome. First, note that∑
j∈N\{i} u
t∗
j (c)
ut∗max(i)− u
t∗
i (c)
6
∑
t∈T
∑
j∈N\{i} u
t
j(c)∑
t∈T (u
t
max(i)− u
t
i(c))
=
∑
j∈N\{i} uj(c)
nPropi − ui(c)
6
(n− 1)
(n− 1)Propi
= 1,
(1)
where the penultimate transition follows because we normalized utilities to achieve
uj(c) = 1 for every j ∈ S \ {i}, every j ∈ N \ S satisfies uj(c) = 0, and player i does
not receive her proportional share. The final transition holds due to our normalization
Propi = 1.
Let δ =
∑
j∈S\{i} u
t∗
j (c). Then, Equation (1) implies ui(c
′) − ui(c) = u
t∗
max(i) −
ut
∗
i (c) > δ. Thus,
ui(c) + δ 6 ui(c
′) < 1, (2)
where the last inequality follows because the original outcome c violated Prop1 for
player i. In particular, this implies δ < 1. Our goal is to show that
∏
j∈S uj(c
′) >
ui(c) =
∏
j∈S uj(c), where the last equality holds due to our normalization uj(c) = 1
for j ∈ S \{i} and because i ∈ S. This would be a contradiction because c maximizes
the product of utilities of players in S. Now,∑
j∈S\{i}
max{0, 1− uj(c
′)} =
∑
j∈S\{i}
max{0, ut
∗
j (c)− u
t∗
j (c
′)} 6
∑
j∈S\{i}
ut
∗
j (c) = δ,
where the first transition follows from setting 1 = uj(c) (by our normalization) and
noting that c and c′ are identical for all issues except t∗, and the second because all
utilities are non-negative.
Hence, Lemma 5 implies that
∏
j∈S\{i} uj(c
′) > 1− δ. Thus,∏
j∈S
uj(c
′) > (1− δ) · (ui(c)+ δ) = ui(c)+ δ · (1−ui(c))− δ
2 > ui(c)+ δ
2− δ2 = ui(c),
where the inequality holds because ui(c) + δ < 1 from Equation (2). 
For private goods division, this result can be derived in a simpler fashion. Cara-
giannis et al. [14] already show that MNW satisfies PO. In addition, they also show
that MNW satisfies EF1, which implies Prop1 due to our next result. To be consistent
with the goods division literature, we use proportionality up to one good (rather than
one issue) in the private goods division context.
Lemma 6. For private goods division, envy-freeness up to one good (EF1) implies
proportionality up to one good (Prop1).
Proof. Take an instance of private goods division with a set of players N and a set of
goods M . Let A be an allocation satisfying EF1. Fix a player i ∈ N .
Due to the definition of EF1, there must exist4 a set of goods X = {gj}j∈N\{i}
such that ui(Ai) > ui(Aj)−ui(gj) for every j ∈ N \{i}. Summing over all j ∈ N \{i},
we get
(n− 1) · ui(Ai) >

 ∑
j∈N\{i}
ui(Aj)

 − ui(X) =⇒ n · ui(Ai) > ui(M)− ui(X)
=⇒ ui(Ai) +
ui(X)
n
>
ui(M)
n
. (3)
4If Aj = ∅, we can add a dummy good gj that every player has utility 0 for, and make Aj = {gj}.
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Note thatX has less than n goods. Suppose player i receives good g∗ ∈ argmaxg∈X ui(g).
Note that g∗ /∈ Ai. Then, we have ui(Ai ∪ {g∗}) > ui(M)/n = Propi, which implies
that Prop1 is satisfied with respect to player i. Because player i was chosen arbitrarily,
we have that EF1 implies Prop1. 
Equation 3 in the proof of Lemma 6 directly implies the following lemma because
the set X in the equation contains at most n− 1 goods.
Lemma 7. Let A be an allocation of private goods that satisfies EF1. Then, for
every player i,
ui(Ai) > Propi −
1
n
n−1∑
t=1
u(t)max(i),
where u
(t)
max(i) is the utility player i derives from her tth most valued good.
Next, we turn our attention to RRS and PPS. While MNW does not satisfy either
of them, it approximates both.
Theorem 8. The MNW solution satisfies 1/n-RRS (and therefore 1/n-PPS). The
approximation is tight for both RRS and PPS up to a factor of O(log n).
Proof. We first show the lower bound. Fix an instance of public decision making, and
let c denote an MNW outcome. Let S ⊆ N denote the set of players that achieve
positive utility under c.
Without loss of generality, let us normalize the utilities such that uj(c) = 1 for
every j ∈ S. Suppose for contradiction that for some player i, ui(c) < (1/n) · RRSi.
First, this implies that RRSi > 0, which in turn implies that player i must be able to
derive a positive utility from at least n different issues. By an argument identical to
that used to argue that ui(c) > 0 in the proof of Theorem 4, it can be shown that we
must also have ui(c) > 0 in this case (i.e., i ∈ S).
Now, recall that the sequence 〈u
(1)
max(i), . . . , u
(m)
max(i)〉 contains the maximum utility
player i can derive from different issues, sorted in a non-ascending order. For every
q ∈ [p], let
tq = argmin
(q−1)n+16t6qn
∑
j∈S\{i}
utj(c).
That is, we divide the public decision making into sets of n issues, grouped by player
i’s maximum utility for them, and for each set of issues, we let tq be the one that
the remaining players derive the lowest total utility from. Note that tq 6 qn for each
q ∈ [p], and therefore u
(tq)
max(i) > u
(qn)
max(i).
We will show that outcome c′, where c′tq = a
tq
max(i) for all q ∈ [p] and c′t = ct for
all other issues t, achieves a higher product of utilities to players in S than c does,
which is a contradiction because c is an MNW outcome. First, note that
ui(c
′) >
p∑
q=1
u(tq)max(i) >
p∑
k=1
u(k·n)max (i) = RRSi > n.
Further, we have∑
j∈S\{i}
max{0, 1− uj(c
′)} =
∑
j∈S\{i}
max{0, uj(c)− uj(c
′)}
=
∑
j∈S\{i}
p∑
q=1
max{0, u
tq
j (c)− u
tq
j (c
′)} 6
∑
j∈S\{i}
p∑
q=1
u
tq
j (c),
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where the first equality follows from our normalization, the second because c and c′
only differ on issues {tq}q∈[p], and the last because all utilities are non-negative.
Reversing the order of the summation and further manipulating the expression,
we have
p∑
q=1
∑
j∈S\{i}
u
tq
j (c) 6
p∑
q=1
1
n
qn∑
t=(q−1)n+1
∑
j∈S\{i}
utj(c) =
1
n
pn∑
t=1
∑
j∈S\{i}
utj(c) 6
n− 1
n
,
where the first transition follows from the definition of tq. By Lemma 5, we have
∏
j∈S
uj(c
′) = ui(c
′)
∏
j∈S\{i}
uj(c
′) > n ·
(
1−
n− 1
n
)
= 1 =
n∏
j=1
uj(c),
where the inequality holds because ui(c
′) > RRSi > n ·ui(c) = n, as player i receives
her round robin share under c′ but did not even receive a 1/n fraction of it under c.
Hence, outcome c′ achieves a higher product of utilities to players in S than c does,
which is a contradiction.
For the upper bound, Consider a public decision making problem with n issues,
where each issue t has two alternatives at1 and a
t
2 with the following utilities to the
players. Let x = (logn− log logn)/n.
a11 a
1
2
u11 1 d
u12 0 x
...
...
...
u1n 0 x
and
at1 a
t
2
ut1 1 d
ut2 0 0
...
...
...
utt 0 1
...
...
...
utn 0 0
for t ∈ {2, . . . , n}.
We choose the value of d later. Note that PPS1 = 1 as long as d < 1. Our goal is to
make the MNW outcome choose alternative at2 for every issue t. Let us denote this
outcome by c. Then, the Nash welfare under c is
(n · d) · (1 + x)n−1. (4)
Let us find conditions on d under which this is greater than the Nash welfare that
other possible outcomes c′ could achieve.
Clearly, if c′1 = a
1
1 and c
′
t = a
t
1 for any t 6= 1, then ut(c
′) = 0, and therefore
NW (c′) = 0. Let us consider c′ under which c′1 = a
1
1 and c
′
t = a
t
2 for all t 6= 1. The
Nash welfare produced by this outcome is
1 + (n− 1)d. (5)
Next, consider c′ with c′1 = a
1
2, c
′
t∗ = a
t∗
1 for some t
∗ 6= 1, and c′t = a
t
2 for all
remaining t. The Nash welfare under this outcome is
(1 + (n− 1)d) · x · (1 + x)n−2. (6)
We do not need to consider outcomes c′ with c′1 = a
1
2 and c
′
t = a
t
1 for multiple
t 6= 1. This is because if switching the outcome from at
∗
2 to a
t∗
1 for even a single
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t∗ 6= 1 decreases the Nash welfare, switching the outcomes on other t 6= 1 would only
further decrease the Nash welfare, as it would reduce the utility to another player t by
the same factor 1/(1 + x), while increasing the utility to player 1 by an even smaller
factor.
Let us identify the conditions on d required for the quantity in Equation (4) to be
greater than the quantities in Equations (5) and (6). We need
(n · d) · (1 + x)n−1 > (1 + (n− 1)d) · 1
⇔ n · d >
1
(1 + x)n−1 − 1 + 1/n
, (7)
and
(n · d)(1 + x)n−1 > (1 + (n− 1)d) · x · (1 + x)n−2
⇔ n · d >
n · x
n+ x
. (8)
It is easy to check that for x = (logn− log logn)/n, the quantities on the RHS of
both Equations (7) and (8) are O(log n/n). Hence, we can set d to be sufficiently low
for n · d to be Θ(logn/n). However, note that n · d is precisely the approximation to
PPS achieved for player 1 under c, as required. 
For private goods, we can show that the MNW solution provides much better
approximations to both RRS and PPS, as a result of its strong fairness guarantee of
EF1.
Lemma 9. For private goods division, envy-freeness up to one good (EF1) implies
PPS and n/(2n− 1)-RRS, but does not imply n/(2n− 2)-RRS.
Proof. Let A be an allocation of private goods that satisfies EF1. First, we show
that A must also satisfy PPS. Suppose for contradiction that it violates PPS. Then,
there exists a player i such that ui(Ai) < PPSi, which in turn implies that |Ai| < p.
Because the average number of goods per player is m
n
> p, there must exist a player
j such that |Aj | > p. Hence, for any good g ∈ Aj , player j has at least p goods even
after removing g from Aj , which implies ui(Aj\{g}) > PPSi > ui(Ai). However, this
contradicts the fact that A is EF1.
We now show that A also satisfies 1/2-RRS. By Lemma 7, we have
ui(Ai) >
1
n
m∑
t=n
u(t)max(i) >
1
n
u(n)max(i) +
p∑
k=2
u(k·n)max (i). (9)
Further, since A satisfies EF1, it must be the case that
ui(Ai) > u
(n)
max(i). (10)
To see this, suppose for contradiction that ui(Ai) < u
(n)
max(i), which implies that
player i is not allocated any of her n most valued goods. Therefore, by the pigeonhole
principle, there must exist a player j ∈ N \ {i} that is allocated at least two of these
goods. Hence, for any g ∈ Aj , we have ui(Aj \ {g}) > u
(n)
max(i) > ui(Ai), which
violates EF1. Finally, adding n times Equation (9) with n − 1 times Equation (10),
we obtain
(2n− 1) · ui(Ai) > n · u
(n)
max(i) + n ·
p∑
k=2
u(k·n)max (i) = n ·RRSi,
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which implies the desired n/(2n− 1)-RRS guarantee.
For the upper bound, consider an instance with n players and n2 goods, and define
player 1’s utility function to be
u1(gj) =
{
1 1 6 j 6 n,
1
n−1 n+ 1 6 j 6 n
2.
Note that RRS1 = 1 + (n − 1)
1
n−1 = 2. Consider the allocation A with A1 =
{gn+1, . . . , g2n}, A2 = {g1, g2}, and Ai = {gi, g(i−1)n+1, . . . , gi·n} for all players i > 2.
Let the utilities of players 2 through n be positive for the goods they receive and zero
for the remaining goods. Hence, they clearly do not envy any players. For player 1,
we have u1(A1) =
n
n−1 , u1(A2 \{g2}) = 1, and u1(Ai \{gi}) =
n
n−1 for all i > 2. That
is, player 1 does not envy any other player up to one good. Hence, A satisfies EF1,
and player 1 obtains a n2n−2 fraction of her RRS share, as required. 
As a corollary of Lemma 9, EF1 implies 1/2-RRS, and this approximation is
asymptotically tight. Further, because the MNW solution satisfies EF1, Lemma 9
immediately provides guarantees (lower bounds) for the MNW solution. However,
the upper bound in the proof of Lemma 9 does not work for the MNW solution.
Next, we establish a much weaker lower bound, leaving open the possibility that the
MNW solution may achieve a constant approximation better than 1/2 to RRS.
Theorem 10. For private goods division, the MNW solution satisfies PPS and
n/(2n − 1)-RRS. For every ε > 0, the MNW solution does not satisfy (2/3 + ε)-
RRS.
Proof. The lower bounds follow directly from Lemma 9 and the fact that the MNW
solution satisfies EF1. For the upper bound, consider an instance with two players
and four goods. Player 1 has utilities (1− δ, 1− δ, 1/2, 1/2) and player 2 has utilities
(1, 1, 0, 0) for goods (g1, g2, g3, g4), respectively. Note that RRS1 = 3/2−δ. The MNW
allocation A is given by A1 = {g3, g4} and A2 = {g1, g2}. Thus,
u1(A1)
RRS1
= 23−2δ . The
upper bound follows by setting δ sufficiently small. 
4 Computational Complexity
In Section 3, we showed that without requiring Pareto optimality, we can achieve
both RRS (thus PPS) and Prop1 in polynomial time using the round robin method
(Theorem 1). In contrast, when we require PO, the leximin mechanism (with an
appropriate normalization of utilities) provides RRS (thus PPS) and PO, while the
MNW solution provides Prop1 and PO. However, both these solutions are NP-hard
to compute [31, 4]. This raises a natural question whether we can efficiently find
outcomes satisfying our fairness guarantees along with PO. For PPS, the answer is
negative.
Theorem 11. It is NP-hard to find an outcome satisfying PPS and PO.
Note that it is the search problem of finding an outcome (any outcome) satisfying
PPS and PO for which we prove computational hardness; the decision problem of
testing the existence of such an outcome is trivial as we know it always exists. Before
we prove this result, we need to introduce a new (to our knowledge) decision problem
and show that it is NP-complete.
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Exact Triple-Cover by 3-sets (X33C): An instance (Y, T ) of X33C is given by
a set Y of r vertices and a set T = {T1, T2, . . . , Tm}, where each Ti is a set of three
vertices. The decision problem is to determine whether it is possible to choose r sets,
with repetition allowed, such that every vertex v is contained in exactly three of the
chosen sets (an exact triple-cover).
Let us contrast this with the definition of the popular NP-complete problem, Exact
Cover by 3-sets (X3C): An instance (X,S) of X3C is given by a set X of 3q vertices
and a set S = {S1, . . . , Sn}, where each Si is a set of three vertices. The decision
problem is to determine if there exists a subset of S of size q that covers every vertex
x ∈ X exactly once (an exact cover).
Lemma 12. X33C is NP-complete.
Proof. Clearly, X33C lies in NP because a triple-cover can be checked in polynomial
time. To show hardness, we reduce from X3C. Given an instance (X,S) of X3C,
divide X into q sets of 3 vertices arbitrarily, indexed by k. For every one of these q
sets of three vertices sk = {sk1 , s
k
2 , s
k
3}, create 8 new vertices, {s
k
i,j : i ∈ [2], j ∈ [4]},
and 10 new sets {T ki,j : i ∈ [2], j ∈ [5]}. The sets T
k
i,j are defined as follows: T
k
i,1 =
{ski,1, s
k
i,2, s
k
i,3}, T
k
i,2 = {s
k
i,2, s
k
i,3, s
k
i,4}, T
k
i,3 = {s
k
i,1, s
k
i,2, s
k
i,4}, T
k
i,4 = {s
k
i,1, s
k
i,3, s
k
1}, and
T ki,5 = {s
k
i,4, s
k
2 , s
k
3}.
The X33C instance is given by (Y = X ∪ {ski,j : i ∈ [2], j ∈ [4], k ∈ [q]}, T =
S ∪ {T ki,j : i ∈ [2], j ∈ [5], k ∈ [q]). Note that |Y | = 11q. We show that (Y, T ) has an
exact triple-cover if and only if there exists an exact cover for (X,S).
First, suppose that there exists an exact cover for (X,S). Then there exists an
exact triple-cover for (Y, T ) by selecting sets T ki,j for every k ∈ [q], i ∈ [2], and j ∈ [5].
It is easy to check that these 10q sets cover each ski,j exactly three times, as well as
covering skk exactly twice, for all k ∈ [q] and k ∈ [3]. Hence, all we need to do is add
the solution to the original X3C instance.
Now, suppose that there exists an exact triple-cover by 3-sets for the X33C in-
stance. This implies that, for any k and i, exactly three sets from {T ki,1, T
k
i,2, T
k
i,3}
must be chosen (recall that we can choose the same set more than once), because
these are the only sets that contain ski,2, which must be covered exactly three times.
We now consider how we can choose these three sets. Suppose that T ki,2 is chosen
more than once. Then only (at most) one of T ki,1 and T
k
i,3 is chosen, so we still need
to cover ski,1 (at least) twice. The only way to do this is by choosing T
k
i,4 twice. But
then ski,3, which is contained in both T
k
i,2 and T
k
i,4, is covered more than three times,
a violation of the conditions of an exact triple-cover. By similar reasoning, we can
show that T ki,3 cannot be chosen more than once. Now suppose that T
k
i,1 is chosen
twice. Then it remains to choose exactly one of T ki,2 and T
k
i,3; suppose WLOG that
we choose T ki,2. Then we still need to cover s
k
i,1 an additional time. The only way
to do this is to choose T ki,4, which also covers s
k
i,3, meaning that s
k
i,3 is covered four
times, violating the condition of the exact triple-cover. Finally, suppose that T ki,1 is
chosen three times. Then we still need to cover ski,4 three times without covering any
of ski,1, s
k
i,2, or s
k
i,3 again. We therefore need to choose T
k
i,5 three times. Otherwise,
we can choose each of T ki,1, T
k
i,2, T
k
i,3, T
k
i,4, and T
k
i,5 once each, which covers each of
ski,1, s
k
i,2, and s
k
i,3 once each. All other options have been ruled out. In particular, it
is necessary to choose T ki,5 at least once.
So there are two options. Regardless of which option we choose, we still have to
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cover each of ski′,1, s
k
i′,2, and s
k
i′,3 three times each, for i
′ 6= i. Since the options for i′
are symmetric to those for i, it is again necessary to choose T ki′,5 at least once. If we
choose T ki,1 three times and T
k
i,5 three times, as well as T
k
i′,5 at least once (as we must),
then sk2 and s
k
3 are covered at least four times, a violation of the exact triple-cover.
Therefore the only possibility is to choose each of T ki,1, T
k
i,2, T
k
i,3, T
k
i,4, and T
k
i,5 once.
Similarly, we must choose each of T ki′,1, T
k
i′,2, T
k
i′,3, T
k
i′,4, and T
k
i′,5 once each also. And,
since k was arbitrary, this holds for all k ∈ [q].
So, for all k ∈ [q] and all i ∈ [2], each of T ki,1, T
k
i,2, T
k
i,3, T
k
i,4, and T
k
i,5 is chosen
exactly once, a total of 10q sets chosen. We therefore have q more sets to choose,
which necessarily cover each of v ∈ S exactly once (note that each v ∈ S corresponds
to an skj for some k ∈ [q] and j ∈ [3], and these are covered exactly once by either
T k1,4 or T
k
1,5, and exactly once again by either T
k
2,4 or T
k
2,5). The only way to choose q
sets that cover each v ∈ S exactly once is by choosing an exact cover for the instance
(X,S). 
Using this lemma, we can now show that finding an outcome satisfying PPS and
PO is NP-hard through a reduction from X33C.
Proof of Theorem 11. Let (Y, T ) be an instance of X33C, with |Y | = r. Let ε ∈
(0, 1/(3r)). We define a public decision making problem as follows. There are r
players, one corresponding to each vertex v ∈ Y , and r issues. For each issue, there
are |Y | + |T | alternatives. For each issue t and each player i, there is an alternative
at,i which is valued at 1 − ε by player i, and 0 by all other players. The remaining
|T | alternatives correspond to the 3-sets from the X33C instance. For a set Tj ∈ T ,
the corresponding alternative is valued at 13 by players i ∈ Tj, and valued at 0 by all
other players. Note that PPSi = 1− ε for each player i, because there are exactly as
many issues as players, and each player values its most preferred alternative for each
issue at 1− ε.
We now show that there exists an exact triple-cover by 3-sets if and only if all
outcomes to the public decision making problem that satisfy PPS and PO have ui(c) =
1 for all i. First, suppose that there exists an exact triple-cover by 3-sets. We need to
show that all outcomes satisfying PPS and PO have ui(c) = 1 for all i. So suppose
otherwise – that there exists an outcome satisfying PPS and PO with ui(c) 6= 1 for
some player i. In particular, some player must have ui(c) > 1, otherwise c is not PO
(because it is possible to choose an outcome corresponding exactly to an exact triple-
cover, which gives each player utility 1). But players only derive utility in discrete
amounts of 1− ε or 13 , which means that any player with ui(c) > 1 has ui(c) >
4
3 − ε.
r∑
i=1
ui(c) >
4
3
− ε+
r−1∑
i=1
(1− ε) =
1
3
+ r − rε > r,
where the last inequality holds because ε < 1/(3r). However, this is a contradiction
because each alternative in each of the r issues contributes at most 1 to the social
welfare. Therefore, every outcome satisfying PPS and PO has ui(c) = 1 for all i.
Next, suppose that there does not exist an exact triple-cover by 3-sets. So if we
choose an alternative corresponding to a 3-set for every issue, it is not possible for
every player to derive utility 1. Therefore, some player must derive utility 23 (or
lower), which violates PPS. Thus, every outcome that satisfies PPS must include at
least one issue where the chosen alternative is one that corresponds to a player, not
to a 3-set. Such an alternative only contributes 1− ε to social welfare. Therefore, the
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social welfare is strictly less than r, which means that some player gets utility strictly
less than 1. Therefore, there is no outcome satisfying PPS (either with or without
PO) such that ui(c) = 1 for all i. Since the set of outcomes satisfying PPS is always
non-empty, it is therefore not the case that all outcomes satisfying PPS and PO have
ui(c) = 1 for all i. 
Because every outcome satisfying RRS also satisfies PPS, we have the following
corollary.
Corollary 13. It is NP-hard to find an outcome satisfying RRS and PO.
For private goods division, we show, in stark contrast to Theorem 11, that we can
find an allocation satisfying PPS and PO in polynomial time. This is achieved using
Algorithm 1. Interestingly, it produces not an arbitrary allocation satisfying PPS
and PO, but an allocation that assigns at least p = ⌊m/n⌋ goods to every player —
implying PPS, and maximizes weighted (utilitarian) social welfare according to some
weight vector — implying PO.
ALGORITHM 1: Polynomial time algorithm to achieve PPS and PO for private goods
Input: The set of players N , the set of private goods M , and players’ utility functions
{ui}i∈N
Output: A deterministic allocation A satisfying PPS and PO
1 w ← (1/n, . . . , 1/n) ∈ Rn;
2 A ← argmax
A′
∑
i∈N wi · ui(A
′);
3 while ∃i ∈ N, |Ai| < p do /* Until every player receives at least p = ⌊m/n⌋ goods
*/
4 GT ← {i ∈ N : |Ai| > p}; /* Partition players by the number of goods they
receive */
5 EQ ← {i ∈ N : |Ai| = p};
6 LS ← {i ∈ N : |Ai| < p};
7 DEC = GT ; /* Players whose weights we will decrease */
8 while DEC ∩ LS = ∅ do
/* Minimally reduce weights of players in DEC so a player in DEC
loses a good */
9 (i∗, j∗, g∗) ← argmini∈DEC,j∈N\DEC,g∈Ai(wi · vi,g)/(wj · vj,g);
10 r ← (wi∗ · vi∗,g∗)/(wj∗ · vj∗,g∗);
11 ∀i ∈ DEC, wi ← wi/r;
12 DEC ← DEC ∪ {j∗};
13 D(j∗) ← (i∗, g∗); /* Bookkeeping: j∗ can receive g∗ from i∗ */
14 end
15 j∗ ← DEC ∩ LS; /* Player from LS who receives a good */
16 while j∗ /∈ GT do
17 (i∗, g∗) ← D(j∗);
18 Ai∗ ← Ai∗ \ {g
∗};
19 Aj∗ ← Aj∗ ∪ {g
∗};
20 j∗ ← i∗;
21 end
22 end
23 return A;
At a high level, the algorithm works as follows. It begins with an arbitrary weight
vector w, and an allocation A maximizing the corresponding weighted (utilitarian)
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social welfare. Then, it executes a loop (Lines 3-22) while there exists a player receiv-
ing less than p goods, and each iteration of the loop alters the allocation in a way that
one of the players who received more than p goods loses a good, one of the players
who received less than p goods gains a good, and every other player retains the same
number of goods as before.
Each iteration of the loop maintains a set DEC of players whose weight it reduces.
Initially, DEC consists of players who have more than p goods (Line 7). When the
weights are reduced enough so that a player in DEC is about to lose a good to
a player, necessarily outside DEC (Lines 9-11), the latter player is added to DEC
(Line 12) before proceeding further. When a player who has less than p goods is added
to DEC, this process stops and the algorithm leverages the set of ties it created along
the way to make the aforementioned alteration to the allocation (Lines 16-21).
We now formally state that this produces an allocation satisfying PPS and PO,
and that it runs in polynomial time; the proof is deferred to the appendix.
Theorem 14. For private goods division, PPS and PO can be satisfied in polynomial
time.
The complexity of finding an allocation (of private goods) satisfying the stronger
guarantee RRS along with PO in polynomial time remains open, as does the com-
plexity of finding an allocation satisfying Prop1 and PO.
We note that the convenient approach of weighted welfare maximization we use
in Theorem 14 cannot be used for finding an outcome satisfying RRS and PO, as the
following example shows. This leads us to conjecture that it may be NP-hard to find
such an outcome.
Example 3. Consider a private goods division problem with two players and four
goods. Player 1 has utilities (4, 4, 1, 1) and player 2 has utilities (3, 3, 2, 2) for goods
(g1, g2, g3, g4), respectively. Note that RRS1 = RRS2 = 5. Consider assigning weights
w1 and w2 to players 1 and 2, respectively. If 4w1 > 3w2, i.e., w1 > 3w2/4 then
player 1 receives both g1 and g2, which means that player 2 receives utility less than
her RRS share. On the other hand, if 3w2 > 4w1, i.e., w1 < 3w2/4 then player 2
receives both g1 and g2, which means that player 1 receives utility less than her RRS
share.
The only remaining possibility is that w1 = 3w2/4, but in that case, player 2
receives both g3 and g4. Regardless of how we divide goods g1 and g2, one of the two
players still receives utility less than her RRS share.
In contrast, a simple modification of Algorithm 1 seems to quickly find an alloca-
tion satisfying Prop1 and PO in hundreds of thousands of randomized simulations.
At each iteration of this version, the set DEC initially consists of players who attain
their proportional share (it is easy to show using the Pigeonhole principle that this
set is non-empty for any weighted welfare maximizing allocation), and ends when a
player is added to DEC that is not currently achieving Prop1. Thus, at every loop, a
player that was receiving her proportional share may lose a good (but will still achieve
at least Prop1), the player added to DEC that was not achieving Prop1 gains a good,
and some players that were achieving Prop1 but not their proportional share may lose
a good, but only if they gain one too. These three classes of players are therefore
analogous to players with more than p goods, less than p goods, and exactly p goods
in Algorithm 1. Unfortunately, we are unable to prove termination of this algorithm
because it is possible that a player who achieves Prop1 but not her proportional share
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loses a high-valued good while gaining a low-valued good, thus potentially sacrificing
Prop1. Thus we do not get a property parallel to the key property of Algorithm 1,
that no player’s utility ever drops below her PPS share, after she attains it. However,
our algorithm always seems to terminate quickly and finds an allocation satisfying
Prop1 and PO in our randomized simulations, which leads us to conjecture that it
may be possible to find an allocation satisfying Prop1 and PO in polynomial time,
either from our algorithm directly or via some other utilization of weighted welfare
maximization.
5 Discussion
We introduced several novel fairness notions for public decision making and consid-
ered their relationships to existing mechanisms and fairness notions. Throughout the
paper, we highlighted various open questions including the existence (and complexity)
of a mechanism satisfying RRS, Prop1, and PO, the complexity of finding an outcome
satisfying Prop1 and PO (for public decisions and private goods), the complexity of
finding an outcome satisfying RRS and PO (for private goods), and whether MNW
provides a constant approximation to RRS better than 1/2.
So far we only considered deterministic outcomes. If randomized outcomes are
allowed (an alternative interpretation in the private goods case is that the goods are
infinitely divisible), then the MNW solution satisfies Prop as a direct consequence of
it satisfying Prop1 for deterministic outcomes (Theorem 4).5 To see this, consider
replicating each issue K times and dividing utilities by K. The relative effect of
granting a single player control of a single issue becomes negligible. Thus, as K
approaches infinity, the utility of each player i in an MNW outcome approaches a
value that is at least their proportional share Propi. The fraction of copies of issue
t in which outcome atj is selected can be interpreted as the weight placed on a
t
j in
the randomized outcome. Because RRS, PPS, and Prop1 are relaxations of Prop, the
randomized MNW outcome also satisfies all of them.
For private goods division, this can be seen as a corollary of the fact that the
randomized MNW outcome satisfies envy-freeness, which is strictly stronger than
proportionality. This hints at a very interesting question: Is there a stronger fairness
notion than proportionality in the public decision making framework that generalizes
envy-freeness in private goods division? Although such a notion would not be satisfi-
able by deterministic mechanisms, it may be satisfied by randomized mechanisms, or
it could have novel relaxations that may be of independent interest.
At a high level, our work provides a framework bringing together two long-studied
branches of social choice theory — fair division theory and voting theory. Both have
at their heart the aim to aggregate individual preferences into a collective outcome
that is fair and agreeable, but approach the problem in different ways. Fair division
theory typically deals with multiple private goods, assumes access to cardinal utilities,
and focuses on notions of fairness such as envy-freeness and proportionality. Voting
theory, in contrast, typically deals with a single public decision (with the exception of
combinatorial voting mentioned earlier), assumes access only to less expressive ordinal
preferences, has the “one voter, one vote” fairness built inherently into the voting
rules, and focuses on different axiomatic desiderata such as Condorcet consistency
and monotonicity.
5Of course, the realization may fail to satisfy Prop (and other desiderata), but the lottery is fair
if we consider expected utilities.
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Of course, one can use a voting approach to fair division, since we can have
players express preferences over complete outcomes, and this approach has been used
successfully to import mechanisms from voting to fair division and vice versa [2, 1].
However, not only does this approach result in an exponential blowup in the number
of alternatives, it also does not provide a convenient way to express fair-division-
like axioms. Continuing to explore connections between the two fields remains a
compelling direction for future work.
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Appendix
A Relationships Among Fairness Axioms
In this section, we analyze the relationship between the fairness properties we intro-
duce in this paper, namely RRS, PPS, and Prop1. First, it is easy to show that Prop1
does not give any approximation to RRS or PPS, both for public decisions and for
private goods, because it is easy to construct examples where a player receives zero
utility, still satisfies Prop1, but has non-zero PPS share.
In the other direction, for public decisions, we showed that RRS implies 1/2-Prop1
(Lemma 3). For private goods, we can refine this result a bit further.
Theorem 15. For private goods division, RRS implies Prop1 if and only if m 6
4n− 2.
Proof. First, let us assume m > 4n− 2. Consider the following fair division instance.
Player 1’s values, in the descending order, are as follows.
ujmax(1) =


(k − 1) · n+ 1 if j = 1,
n if j ∈ {2, . . . , k · n− 1},
1 if j > k · n.
It is easy to check that player 1’s RRS share is exactly u1max(1). Consider an allocation
in which player 1 receives only his most valuable good, and the remaining goods are
partitioned among the other players arbitrarily. For the sake of completeness, let each
other player have value 1 for each good he receives under this allocation, and 0 for
the remaining goods. Hence, the allocation satisfies RRS.
Now, player 1’s proportional share is given by
(k − 1) · n+ 1+ (kn− 2) · n+ (m− kn+ 1) · 1
n
=
m+ kn2 − 3n+ 2
n
>
n+ kn2
n
= kn+ 1,
where the second transition follows because m > 4n− 2.
The highest value that player 1 can achieve by adding one more good to his
allocation is (k − 1) · n+ 1 + n = kn+ 1, which falls short of the proportional share.
Hence, the allocation is not Prop1.
Now, let us assume that m 6 4n− 2. Hence, k 6 3. Take a fair division instance,
and let us focus on a player i. For the sake of notational convenience, we define
ujmax(i) = 0 for j ∈ {m+1, . . . , 4n− 2}. Note that this affects neither his RRS share
nor his satisfaction of Prop1.
We now show that if player i receives at least as much value as his RRS share
unmax(1)+u
2n
max(1)+u
3n
max(1), then we can make player i receive his proportional share
by adding a single good to his allocation.
If player i does not receive his most valuable good, then this can be accomplished
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by adding his most valuable good to his allocation because
u1max(i) + u
n
max(1) + u
2n
max(1) + u
3n
max(1)
>
∑n
j=1 u
j
max(i)
n
+
∑2n
j=n+1 u
j
max(i)
n
+
∑3n
j=2n+1 u
j
max(i)
n
+
∑4n−2
j=3n+1 u
j
max(i)
n
>
∑m
j=1 u
j
max(i)
n
.
The first transition follows because ujmax(i) > v
j+1
max(i) for all j ∈ [4n− 3].
Suppose player i receives his most valuable good. Let t be the smallest index such
that player i does not receive his tth most valuable good. Hence, t > 2. Let ui denote
the utility to player i under the current allocation. Then, we have that
ui >
t−1∑
j=1
ujmax(i). (11)
ui > v
n
max(i) + u
2n
max(i) + v
3n
max(i). (12)
Multiplying Equation (11) by 1/n and Equation (12) by (n − 1)/n, and adding, we
get
ui >
∑t−1
j=1 u
j
max(i)
n
+
n− 1
n
· (unmax(i) + u
2n
max(i) + u
3n
max(i))
>
∑t−1
j=1 u
j
max(i) +
∑2n−1
j=n+1 u
j
max(i) +
∑3n−1
j=2n+1 u
j
max(i) +
∑4n−2
j=3n u
j
max(i)
n
=
∑t−1
j=1 u
j
max(i) +
∑4n−2
j=n+1 u
j
max(i)− u
2n
max(i)
n
>
∑t−1
j=1 u
j
max(i) +
∑4n−2
j=n+2 u
j
max(i)
n
.
If t > n + 2, player i already receives his proportional share. Otherwise, let us
now add player i’s tth most valuable good to his allocation. His utility increases to
ui + u
t
max(i) >
∑t−1
j=1 u
j
max(i) +
∑4n−2
j=n+2 u
j
max(i)
n
+
∑n+1
j=t u
j
max(i)
n
=
∑m
j=1 u
j
max(i)
n
,
where the first transition follows because t > 2. Thus, player i receives his propor-
tional share after adding a single good to his allocation. Because player i was chosen
arbitrarily, we have that the allocation satisfies Prop1. 
B Proof of Lemma 5
We will say that a set {x1, . . . , xn} of n non-negative real numbers is feasible for a
given 0 < δ < 1 if
∑n
k=1max{0, 1− xk} 6 δ.
Let X = {x1, . . . , xn} be a feasible set and let i = argmink∈[n]{xk}, so that xi is
the minimum value in X . Suppose that xi > 1−δ. We will show that there necessarily
exists another feasible set X ′ = {x′1, . . . , x
′
n} with
∏n
i=1 x
′
i <
∏n
i=1 xi.
To that end, let j = argmink∈[n]\{i}{xk}, so that xj is the second-lowest value in
X . If xj > 1 then set x
′
i = 1− δ and x
′
k = xk for all k ∈ [n] \ {i}. Clearly this set X
′
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is feasible since
n∑
k=1
max{0, 1− xk} = 1− xi = δ,
and
n∏
k=1
x′k = x
′
i
∏
k 6=i
x′k < xi
∏
k 6=i
xk =
n∏
k=1
xk.
Now consider the case where xj < 1. Let ε =
1
2 (1 − xj) and define x
′
i = xi − ε,
x′j = xj + ε, and x
′
k = xk for all k ∈ [n] \ {i, j}.. For feasibility of X
′,
n∑
k=1
max{0, 1− x′k} =
∑
k∈[n]\{i,j}
max{0, 1− x′k}+max{0, 1− xi + ε}+max{0, 1− xi + ε}
=
∑
k∈[n]\{i,j}
max{0, 1− xk}+ (1− xi + ε) + (1 − xj − ε)
=
∑
k∈[n]\{i,j}
max{0, 1− xk}+ (1− xi) + (1− xj)
=
n∑
k=1
max{0, 1− xk},
and
n∏
k=1
x′k = x
′
ix
′
j
∏
k 6=i,j
x′k = (xi−ε)(xj+ε)
∏
k 6=i,j
xk = (xixj−(xj−xi)ε−ε
2) < xixj
∏
k 6=i,j
xk =
n∏
k=1
xk.
To complete the proof, it remains to show that any feasible set with smallest entry
xi = 1 − δ has
∏n
k=1 xk > 1− δ. Note that if xi = 1− δ then for X to be feasible it
can not be the case that xj < 1. Therefore,
n∏
k=1
xk = (1− δ)
∏
k 6=i
xk > (1 − δ).

C Proof of Theorem 14
First, we prove that Algorithm 1 produces an allocation satisfying PPS and PO. In
particular, we prove that at the end, allocation A satisfies (A) |Ai| > p for every
player i ∈ N , and (B) A maximizes the weighted social welfare
∑
i∈N wi · ui(Ai).
Note that property (A) implies that A satisfies PPS, and property (B) implies that
A is PO.
Before we prove these claims, we note thatAmaximizes the weighted social welfare
if and only if it allocates each good g ∈M to a player i maximizing wi · ui(g).
First, we prove claim (A). Because the outer loop (Lines 3-22) explicitly runs until
each player receives at least p goods, we simply need to prove that the loop terminates.
For this, we need to analyze the first inner loop (Lines 8-14) and the second inner
loop (Lines 16-21).
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Each iteration of the first inner loop reduces the weights of players in DEC, and
adds a player j∗ ∈ N \ DEC to DEC. Because |DEC| increases by one in each
iteration, the first inner loop terminates after O(n) iterations.
The second inner loop starts from the player j∗ ∈ LS that was added to DEC
at the end of the first inner loop, and traces back to the player i∗ that was about to
lose good g∗ to j∗ when j∗ was added to DEC. The good is explicitly transferred,
and if player i∗ had exactly p goods initially, the algorithm continues to find another
good to give back to player i∗ by tracing back to the conditions under which player i∗
was added to DEC. This way, the transfers add a good to a player who was in LS,
maintain the number of goods of the players who were in EQ, and remove a good
from a player who was in GT . Because in each iteration, player i∗ had to be present
in DEC before player j∗ was added, this loop cannot continue indefinitely, and must
terminate in O(n) iterations as well.
Thus, both inner loops terminate in O(n) iterations, and in each iteration of the
outer loop, a player in LS receives an additional good without any new players being
added to LS. This monotonically reduces the metric
∑
i∈LS p− |Ai| by at least 1 in
each iteration. Because this metric can be at most p · n 6 m to begin with, the outer
loop executes O(m) times.
We now prove claim (B). That is, we want to show that allocation A remains a
maximizer of the weighted social welfare according to weight vector w at during the
execution of the algorithm. Because we specifically select A to be a weighted social
welfare maximizer in Line 2, we simply show that neither the weight update in the
first inner loop nor the changes to the allocation in the second inner loop violate this
property.
In the first inner loop, because the weights of players in DEC are reduced by the
same multiplicative factor, goods can only transfer from players in DEC to players
in N \DEC. However, the choice of r in Line 10 ensures that the weight reduction
stops when the first such potential transfer creates a tie, preserving allocation A as
a weighted welfare maximizer. Alterations to allocation A during the second inner
loop also do not violate this property because this loop only transfers a good g∗ from
player i∗ to player j∗ when the two players were anyway tied to receive the good.
This concludes our claim that the algorithm terminates, and correctly produces an
allocation satisfying PPS and PO. We already established that the outer loop executes
O(m) times, and the two inner loops execute O(n) times. The bottleneck within the
inner loops is the argmin computation in Line 9, which requires O(n · m) time to
find the minimum across all goods owned by players in DEC and all players outside
DEC. Consequently, the asymptotic running time complexity of the algorithm is
O(m · n · nm) = O(n2 ·m2). 
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